Paper on Personal and Social Development in Experiential Education
“Frustration” in Outdoor Education:
Is “Happy” a Yuppie Word?
Is “Happy” a Yuppie Word?
Dust Kunkel
“. . . Researchers believe they have already found some tantalizing hints of nature’s assembly methods. The first key principle. . . is ‘frustration.’ Emergent behaviour appears most likely to arise from [multiple] systems . . . competing against each other . . . frustration could be a universal organising principle of nature.”
Abstract
Dewey’s philosophy removes dualisms, replacing them with a pragmatic model that leans on refining “raw experience” and “resolving the problem”—a legacy from Hegel and the industrial age. This diminishes ongoing discussion in education about the nature of being, or “personal and social development,” because other ontologies and epistemologies are underrepresented or not allowed to present themselves as “dissenting.” A need for “resolution” or “fixing the problem” in order to “learn as a group” also positions groups in OE with a potential to devalue individuals who dissent. The role of “frustration” is introduced as a potential perspective—one in many—that an outdoor educator can use to frame authentic questions while working with individuals and groups.
‘Playing’ At Personal and Social Development?
We were sitting in a circle and had to decide who was going to get “voted off.” That is the “nice” way of saying it. The game was “Mafia.” The object was for the “townspeople” to figure out who the “mafia” were and get rid of them: it was kill or be killed. So, within the context of the game the vote was actually to “kill someone.” I said, “I’m not going to vote.” I made the decision, on the spur of the moment, to act in the game as I would hope to act in “real life.” I would not decide unless it was somehow “informed.” The game ground to a frustrated halt. The group was faced with this issue: how do you play a game based on a killing vote if a member of the group refuses. After some frustration, the group moved on without me and still voted to kill someone. I was “removed” by vote in the next round. This happened almost identically in the second game.
Questions generated by “Mafia” included these: Was it “just a game?” Should I disregard it as having wider significance? In what ways is outdoor education (OE) “like a game?” How does our situation affect us? Do dissenters fit in groups? If they “fit,” what group might help them “develop?” Does OE “develop” us at all?
This incident from our cohort’s “Personal and Social Development (PSD) Trip” this September begins a discussion on the limits and benefits of PSD for my approach as a practitioner. Specifically, I explore the variance between group and the individual, between consensus and dissent, and enter into a critical perspective on the philosophical role of “experience” and “resolution” in education.
Presuppositions include:
1. Addressing concerns contextually is helpful--each person and group brings to OE attitudes and values from a societal milieu (Allison, 2000; Higgins, 2000; Hofstede 2001; Delay, 1996).
a. A discussion of this scope is framed by Brookes’ assertion that “distinctive claims made for OAE are floated in OAE publications rather than submitted to less partisan scrutiny in the broader educational, therapeutic, or human development literature” (2003, p. 418).
2. A crucial question confronting practitioners is how our models of engagement flow from views of human nature and motivation (Gatto, 2003; Delay, 1996; Storey, 2003).
3. My personal experience--17 years living in a consensus-based society in Ghana, West Africa.
It is important to recognize that the history of philosophical thought has always questioned the variance between individual and the group, or “social cohesion and individual liberty” (Russell, 1961, p. 15). With this as a starting point, I reference definitions of “dissent” and “consensus” (chosen purposefully from the online encyclopedia Wikipedia--itself, a consensus-built tool):
“Dissent: the sentiment of non-agreement with the majority, or the leader, of a group to which the "dissenter" is supposed to belong or to obey. . .” (Wikipedia, 2005a); “The protection of freedoms that facilitate peaceful dissent has become a hallmark of free and open societies” (Wikipedia, 2005b).
I limit myself to consensus [which has several nuances] as it applies to the “Mafia” experience:
Consensus . . . is a general agreement among the members of a given group or community . . . [and] a theory and practice of getting such agreements. . . . Instead of one opinion being adopted by a plurality, stakeholders are brought together (often with facilitation) until a convergent decision is developed. . . . Consensus upon a particular formal model of consensus can lead to groupthink, by making it harder for those who reject any of that formal model to have their case heard out in informal terms or using a different model. . . . people modify their opinions to reflect what they believe others want them to think. . . (Wikipedia, 2005c).
Consensus may have different cultural meanings, and an inherent power motif: Hofstede connects the vast differences between “individualism and collectivism” (i.e. dissent/consensus) among cultures (2001, pp. 209-278) to the concept of “power distance”--how society handles human inequality (pp. 79-143). Foucault points out “the practice of placing individuals under 'observation' is a natural extension of a justice imbued with disciplinary methods and examination procedures . . . Is it surprising that prisons resemble factories, schools, barracks, hospitals, which all resemble prisons” (1977, p. 228)?
Opposing this use of collective power, Mill wrote 130 years ago:
. . . the individual is not accountable to society for his actions, in so far as these concern the interests of no person but himself . . . the standard. . . may be conveyed in these words: the greatest dissemination of power consistent with efficiency; but the greatest possible centralization of information, and diffusion of it from the centre. . . (2005, p. 27).
One wonders what an OE experience might be like following Mill’s philosophy? Mill was only echoing Paine, whose Common Sense fuelled the American Revolution and a dissent-based culture (Wikipedia, 2005d).
On the PSD trip, I have clear memory of at least three students repeatedly wondering, “What are the instructors watching for?” These postgraduate learners seemed unsure of the instructor roles and seemed habituated to “being watched” as a prerequisite for a “learning situation.” Is it possible that OE participants may be coming from a society that, for all its rhetoric about “privacy,” seeks to control its members through invasive “softer” uses of power (Foucault, 1977)? Foucault theorized that societies control their members more effectively if they are kept in the “open light” rather than dungeons (p. 228). Given the heavy usage of OE by corporate and government constituents who bring “workers for team building” or “at risk students,” it might be suggested that the outdoors and “education” can serve as control mechanisms in a power structure. Is it possible that in this context words may have double meanings? Like the word “vote” in Mafia? Or, the word “consensus?” Or the word “facilitator?”
And what is “consensus” anyway? Chomsky claims media in the West “manufactures consent” (Herman & Chomsky, 1988). If the media can do it, are there ways that, as a “facilitator,” I may also manufacture consent? Examples of useful consensus do exist. The “web” is a rich source for information-based consensual groups like Wikipedia. However, this consensus seems more like Mill’s “greatest . . . centralization of information” concept. My own experience in Ghana and in OE settings is that groups of carefully-listening individuals can approach helpful answers for families, tribes, villages, and OE groups. However, given the context of corporate dominance of public and personal life, it could be suggested that Western society is moving towards a different meaning of “consensus.” Translation: “group think.” At this point, we need the philosopher, Dewey, for insight into the roots of consensus in OE.
Dewey Resolves the Brave New OE World
Hunt looks at Dewey as a philosopher involved in education (1995), as do others (Dewey, 1938; Wikipedia, 2005e). Dewey “saw his major philosophical task as dealing with this fundamental issue [dualistic thinking] and, hopefully, solving it” (Hunt, Jr., 1995). For this over-arching goal, Gatto calls Dewey’s philosophy “neo-Hegelian” (2003, p. 276). Prior to Hegel, dualisms and polarities were not “resolved” in a philosophical sense. “The aim of the Hegelian philosophy was a synthesis, and its method the mediation of opposites” (Thomas, 1957, p. 11). By removing all dualisms, Dewey highlights experience as “raw data” (Hunt, Jr., 1995, p. 26) and presents a “scientific method” reliant on cognition for making meaning of this “raw data:” “Above all, they should know how to utilize the surroundings, physical and social, that exist so as to extract from them all that they have to contribute to building up experiences that are worth while” (Dewey, 1938, p. 40).
His conceptual language is couched in terms directly from the industrial age in which he was born: what does one do with experience but “extract”—dig out, refine, burn off the dross—and “build up” something “better.” After 150 years of Western society built on industry and corporate domination of world affairs, it might be suggested that a view of education that sees life as “raw material”--and learning as the tool that “extracts” it--is suspect as a unifying theory. I do not question the emergent aspects of Dewey’s philosophy, but rather his stated desire to provide a unifying theory for education. The designs for this theory’s ultimate use are found in Hall-Quest’s foreword to Experience and Education: “Directed by such a positive philosophy, American educators will erase their contentious labels and in solid ranks [italics mine] labor in behalf of a better tomorrow” (p. 11). What are the connotations of an entire nation of educators labouring in “solid ranks?” How do educators utilize this context in their interpretations of Dewey’s legacy?
By summarily dispossessing the educative world of former tensions and providing this “new” theory of unification, Dewey closes the very door on the dialectic that he professes to advocate. He presents an alternative suspect for its heavy reliance on two forces that have led Western industrial nations in their ethically contentious policies across the globe: industry and science (Gatto, 2003). It is ironic that Dewey is labelled “organic” and “holistic” by at least one writer (Quay, 2003), presumably because of statements like “the [educative] process is a continuous spiral” (Dewey, 1938, p. 79). Ironic, because the use of words like “process” should not de facto connote “organic”--It is a recognized fact in the biological sciences that “unregulated growth” and “uncontrolled cell division” in a continuous spiral in an organism is known as one thing: cancer (Wikipedia, 2005f). Machines and algorithms follow processes, does it follow that they are organic? How much of this “unmitigated growth” thinking is embedded in Western educative hegemony? Is “going to the mountains” in OE another way to “extract” the raw materials within myself and create a “refined” person—or is it “refined product?” What about hazardous waste “by-products?” How incongruous is this in a field that, in some realms, seeks an ecological epistemology as a framework for education (Nicol, 2003)?
Dewey’s authority for learning, when stripped of decades of educative trappings, is simple: not only “experience” but also the method (scientific) by which one makes meaning of experience. Kolb, a Dewey-disciple, raises “learning” to the level of spirituality—“learning will pull us through” (1984, p. 2); “. . . experiential learning is . . . a program for profoundly re-creating our personal lives and social systems” (p. 18); “it is the integration of these polarities that fuels the endless circular process of knowing” (p. 229). The contradiction is that this educational philosophy claims clear-headed scientific methodology, yet labels itself with spiritual terms. Dewey presents himself as providing something better, not about the control of “traditional” (i.e. authoritarian) education (Dewey, 1938). However, this is a problematic claim based on his industry-laden terminology and “insider” role as an acclaimed “expert” on education within America--an industrial America just entering a massive move to mandatory education (Gatto, 2003). Are learners perceived as cogs within a highly efficient social machine? How often is OE today used as the “last gasp” adjustment tool for problem pieces in the machinery?
We return to dissent and consensus. “Irreconcilable differences” are not something that Hegel accepts. Although he admits opposites, contradictions, polarities and paradoxes, he resolves them in his ultimate answer: the world system (Russell, 1961, pp. 701-715). If Dewey draws his philosophy from these waters, what are some things we can expect? This paper lacks the room to address the many philosophical alternatives to Experience and Education. Here is one of many: according to Thomas, Kierkegaard claims “. . . the assumption underlying the Hegelian system was that the philosopher could view things in the same way as God” (1957, p. 151); and, “. . . the great thinker. . . was not the person who had constructed a system which would explain everything but rather he who recognised that above every system there was a paradox” (p. 155). Kierkegaard and other existentialists might suggest that a theory which explains, resolves, or “unifies” that which we do not comprehend is just a “hall of mirrors” gifting the existence of the individual to the collective on a platter. A false consensus.
Algorithmic, Situationist, Constructivist, Metaphoric, Experiential, Priestian Misadventure?
They tell me “everything’s gonna be alright,” but I don’t know what “alright” even means. Bob Dylan
Within OE writing there seems to be a lack of consensus on what “personal and social development” is. I found multiple philosophical approaches to PSD: Mortlock’s original 4-stage adventure philosophy compartmentalizes death as “misadventure” (1987) and, it might be suggested, reduces its ontological centrality—unlike the major religions/philosophies’ views on the centrality of death. Using “metaphor” as a foundation for OE (Bacon, 1983; Loynes, 2003) has its drawbacks since Allison points out we no longer share metanarratives in a postmodern world of “shifting sands” (2000, p. 45).
Drasdo makes sure we understand that “experience is more than expertise” (1997, p. 3), but what, exactly, is that? Bell gives away his behaviorist-influenced hand with his word-choice: “. . . the more opportunities a person has to support the initiate and apply social pressure . . . reinforces the goals of the rites of passage program” (2003, p. 48). Closing in on the consensus/dissent issue, White looks at socialisation in education and questions its potential for conformism, but essentially has no other recommendations other than a modest “let’s not throw the baby out with the bathwater” (1975, p. 127).
There seems to be an ongoing debate, led by Mcdonald (2000) and Loynes (2002) who question the “priestian” and “algorithmic” philosophies in OE. Is it a further possibility that educators may not realise their algorithmic practice may extract its energy from Dewey’s philosophy of experience? Barnes implies an algorithmic viewpoint, using phrases like “the complete practical theory,” “all about leadership,” “the key to motivation,” and “the secret of reviewing”—as if his book held every answer (1997, pp. 3-4). Gair invokes diagrams and flowcharts for dealing with OE issues (1997). As previously mentioned, Quay believes Dewey falls within the “organic” category of learning theories, and liberally quotes Dewey with the implication that his philosophy is the connection between experiential education and other theories of learning (2003, p. 105).
Brookes questions whether we can “build character”—i.e., “personal development”--at all through OE programs (2003). Mckenzie is an example of this underlying assumption on “character building” with statements like “if compassion is a key educational objective. . . it needs to be addressed more significantly in our practice [via the inclusion of ‘service’]” (2003, p. 21). Wurdinger melds “character building” with algorithmic thinking when he promotes models and sequences to achieve a set goal—ironically, “student autonomy” (2003, p. 46). More recently, Beames—following Brookes’ lead--engages the “character building” issue from a “constructivist” perspective and notes his research is fuelled by OAE’s lack of understanding of how the “elements of an experience fuel the outcomes” (2004, p. 145). Stolz affirms “social constructionist theory” as a viable OE methodology, and proposes “the way we explain the world arises from active cooperation of persons” (2000, p. 5). However, a potential problem is that “social constructionist” practitioners may unintentionally label “uncooperative” people “troubled,” or even “learning-disabled” based on this cooperation criterion for learning.
At the heart of the issue revolving around “character building” is power/control, and consensus/dissent. Brookes raises one of his “serious questions” as to whether “. . . the situations that OAE has used traditionally may be seen to be coercive or manipulative when subjected to more careful study” (2003, p. 60). In fact, Brookes suggests “it is timely to examine what conformist effects might be embedded in OAE practices . . . in the form of group norms and the consequences of going against them, and lack of channels for dissent” (p. 59).
Frustration
“‘Happy’ is a yuppie word . . . nothing is sound, nothing is sound, nothing is sound.” Switchfoot
Does “resolving” a problem make me a “real learner?” What about a community that teaches/learns primarily through shared stories [my experience in Ghana], or a different understanding of “consensus?” What about communities of “dissenters?” Where does the following quote fit?
“The goal of real education is to bring us to a place where we take full responsibility for our own lives . . . in full command of the spectacular gift of free will” (Gatto, 2003, p. 299). The starting point, from this perspective, is the individual, not the group. It is a relationship of priority, not a synthesis. It places the will above the brain. Loyne’s “generative paradigm” also springs from the individual as a choice-maker: “it incorporates actions based on the experiences inspired by learners choosing for themselves how to make a difference. The individual . . . becomes an agent in their world” (2002, p. 121).
Dewey’s philosophy—scientific-method synthesis “bringing about consummations in life” (Crosby, 1995, p. 12)--is a potential hindrance. In the Hegel-Dewey-Kolb construct, one “resolves the problems or conflicts” or “refines the raw product” in order to have authentic learning. As a “measuring stick” for learning, it might be suggested that neo-Hegelian “resolution” has the potential for objectifying persons as “problems” and omitting realms of discourse, for missing the meaning of tragedy and “making meaning” from that which is absurd.
I return to the quote at the very beginning of this paper. Is it possible that unrelieved “frustration” could fuel “emergent behaviour” in my own learning? Do I need to resolve things? Is “happiness [by resolving my dialectic problems] a yuppie word?” Does society go outdoors because people are simply trying to escape the “increased and monotonous specialisation” of an industrial and technological society (Drasdo, 1972, p. 7) that treats humans as “parts” and “resources?” What role does OE have in this societal context? And why do we play games like “Mafia” anyway? If life were “Mafia,” or “Mafia” was life, who would be voted off first? Or would we have the insight to refuse to play?
“Frustration” provokes helpful—but frustrating!--questions regarding my educative stance when I lead individuals and groups in the outdoors: Am I focusing on bringing resolution to this group’s issue? How comfortable am I with being frustrated? How can I prepare “space” for more than just “problem-solving?” Is there space for dissent? Who am I viewing as a “problem that needs to be solved?” Have we achieved consensus, or are there “things” being left unsaid? Is consensus a blindfold? When does the scientific method not work? How behavioristic, algorithmic, generative, emergent, existential, rational, situationist, constructivist, fatalist, free-will, deterministic, authentic, fill-in-the-blank am I? Have I considered the possibility that frustration doesn’t need to be “resolved?” Have individuals and the group considered this?
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